SANAA/RIYADH — Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have signaled a willingness to compartmentalize their disputes over Yemen, with a October 18 meeting between Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed indicating renewed dialogue between the two Gulf partners.
The shift in tone comes as Houthi advances along the Red Sea coast and increased attacks on Saudi territory have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the anti-Houthi coalition. The October 18 meeting provided a public indication of renewed dialogue, with bin Salman praising the "historical relations between our two brotherly countries."
While the official readout did not announce a Yemen military agreement, separate reporting indicates Abu Dhabi has agreed to resume payments to government-aligned forces in southern Yemen, a region where the UAE has long sought influence. In exchange, Saudi Arabia's air force would provide support for those forces against Houthi rebels.
The rapprochement follows a severe rupture in December 2025, when UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces captured large parts of Hadramawt and al-Mahra provinces bordering Saudi Arabia. Riyadh viewed the advance as a direct threat to its national security, triggering severe public recriminations including a Saudi-led airstrike on a weapons shipment at Mukalla port and an abrupt demand for remaining UAE forces to leave Yemen.
The confrontation exposed competing visions for Yemen that have strained the intervention from the outset. Although both led a war against the Houthis starting in 2015, Riyadh backed the internationally-recognized government while Abu Dhabi cultivated southern armed groups, including the separatist Southern Transitional Council. Riyadh wanted a unified government capable of defeating the Houthis, while the UAE prioritized advancing southern Yemen's independence via the STC to gain control over strategic ports including Aden.
The UAE's withdrawal following the December confrontation created what STC official Amr al-Bidh described as "a huge vacuum of deterrence against the Houthis and managing the situation, especially regarding the operational capabilities on the ground." Residual command networks and personal loyalties from previous Emirati backing remain intact, however, and Abu Dhabi maintains significant leverage through relationships with capable local militias including the Giants Brigades and Tarek Saleh's National Resistance Forces.
Fundamental disagreements persist. Riyadh insists on working with the Islah party within the internationally-recognized government, despite both governments' hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood, which allegedly ties Islah. The UAE has reportedly hired mercenaries to assassinate Islah leaders, seeing no room for compromise. As long as Riyadh insists on working with Islah as a pragmatic means of strengthening the anti-Houthi coalition, this disagreement alone may hinder the level of support Abu Dhabi will provide for government-backed forces.
Regional factors also matter. Saudi Arabia has called on Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt for defensive support against Houthi strikes, in line with the Mecca Defense Alliance, signaling it is looking beyond its traditional reliance on the UAE.
Any Saudi-UAE military coordination will remain fragile so long as the two Gulf powers continue to pursue conflicting endgames for Yemen. The real test is whether renewed cooperation yields accountable financing, coherent command structures and a political process that genuinely includes Yemen's competing factions. Without those elements, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may very well end up assembling a coalition that will fight the Houthis today but crumble tomorrow, further fueling the instability that has long plagued Yemen.
